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JUSTICIABILITY
US. Const. art. III, § 2, cl. 1:
The judicial Power shall extend to all Cases, in Law and
Equity, arising under this Constitution, the Laws of the United
States, and Treaties made, or which shall be made, under their
Authority;-to all Cases affecting Ambassadors, other public
Ministers and Consuls;-to all Cases of admiralty and maritime
Jurisdiction;--to Controversies to which the United States shall be
a Party;-to Controversies between two or more States;-between a
State and Citizens of another State;-between Citizens of different
States;-between Citizens of the same State claiming Lands under
Grants of different States, and between a State, or the Citizens
thereof and foreign States, Citizens or Subjects.
COURT OF APPEALS
Rudder v. Pataki'
(decided May 6, 1999)
One month before the termination of the Office of Regulatory and
Management Assistance, Governor George E. Pataki created the
position of Director of Regulatory Reform (hereinafter "Director")
with Executive Order No. 20.' The Director is charged with
overseeing the Governor's Office of Regulatory Reform (hereinafter
"GORR"), the office authorized to evaluate rule proposals offered by
the Executive branch administrative agencies? Plaintiffs
commenced an action following the Director's refusal of a proposed
I 93 N.Y.2d 273,711 N.E.2d 978, 689 N.Y.S.2d 701(1999).
2 See N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 9, § 5.20 (1998).
3 Rudder 11, 93 N.Y.2d at 277, 711 N.E.2d at 979, 689 N.Y.S.2d at 703. More
succinctly, the GORR may authorize publication of the rule, require specified
changes before publication, or prohibit publication entirely, effectively blocking
the proposed rule from promulgation. Id.
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amendment to the rules of the Department of Health,4 "seeking a
declaratory judgment that Executive Order No. 20 was
unconstitutional." Summary judgment was granted in favor of the
Governor and the Supreme Court dismissed the complaint entirely.6
The Appellate Division reversed, holding plaintiffs lacked standing
to raise their constitutional claims.7 On appeal, plaintiffs claimed
standing was satisfied based on three theories: organizational, citizen
taxpayer and voter standing.8 The Court of Appeals, in affirming the
Appellate Division, focused its reasoning on organizational standing.
The Court concluded plaintiffs did not have standing as they failed to
meet the first two prongs of the organizational standing test. Further,
4 See N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGs. tit. 10, § 405.28(d) (1990). Section
405.28(d) reads in pertinent part "[a]ll hospitals.., shall have an organized
social work department, which shall be directed by a qualified social worker."
The proposed amendment, negated by the GORR, would have required the
director of the social work department to hold a "Master's degree in social work
from an accepted educational program." Rudder v. Pataki, 246 A.D.2d 183,
185, 675 N.Y.S.2d 653,655 (3d Dep't 1998).
' Rudder II, 93 N.Y.2d at 278, 711 N.E.2d at 980,689 N.Y.S.2d at 703.
6 Rudder I, 246 A.D.2d at 185, 675 N.Y.S.2d at 655 (Mercure, J., dissenting).
Justice Mecure and Justice Spain concurred in dissent "agree[ing] with plaintiffs
that the executive order violates the doctrine of separation of powers . . .." Id.
The dissent indicated the "Governor has the power to oversee but not necessarily
to direct." Id. at 190, 675 N.Y.S.2d at 658-59 (Mercure, J., dissenting) (citing
Rapp v. Carey, 44 N.Y.2d 157, 162, 375 N.E.2d 745, 748, 404 N.Y.S.2d 565,
567 (1978)). In the view of the dissent, "the executive order's grant of absolute
veto power over proposed rulemaking provides an enforcement mechanism far
exceeding that employed in any present or former legislative enactment."
Rudder 1, 246 A.D.2d at 191, 675 N.Y.S.2d at 659 (Mercure, J., dissenting).
However, the Appellate Division never reached this issue as they reversed the
Supreme Court holding that plaintiffs lacked standing to bring their
constitutional claims. Id. at 187, 675 N.Y.S.2d at 656.
7 Id. at 187, 675 N.Y.S.2d at 656.
8 Rudder II, 93 N.Y.2d at 278, 711 N.E.2d at 980, 689 N.Y.S.2d at 703. The
following are some of the organizational plaintiffs who brought suit along with
individual plaintiff Cynthia Rudder: Nursing Home Coalition of New York
State, Inc.; Friends and Relatives of the Institutionalized Aged, Inc.; Disabled in
Action of Metropolitan New York. Ltd.; New York Statewide Senior Action
Council, Inc.; Center for Medical Consumers and Healthcare Information, Inc.;
and the Coalition of Institutionalized Aged and Disabled, Inc. Id at 280, 711
N.E.2d at 981, 689 N.Y.S.2d at 705 (FN *).
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the Court did not attempt to reach any other issues and affirmed the
Appellate Division's ruling that plaintiffs did not have standing.
The GORR's disapproved an amendment to 10 NYCRR
405.28(d), the minimum standards of hospitals. This rule states "[a]ll
hospitals... shall have an organized social work department, which
shall be directed by a qualified social worker."'0 The proposed
changes to the rule would require the director of the department of
social work to have a Master's degree in social work from an
accredited school." Subsequently, the Director of the Nursing Home
Community Coalition of New York State, Cynthia Rudder 2 and
various other organizations representing the interest of social
workers, such as the New York City Chapter of the National
Association of Social Workers and 1199 National Health and Human
Services Employees Union, 3 commenced action in the Supreme
Court claiming the unconstitutionality of GORR'
4 Plaintiffs'
Supreme Court claim rested on the notion that the creation of the
GORR, via Executive Order No. 20," allowed the Governor's office
to circumvent the legislative authority vested in the agency heads and
assume authority naturally vested in the legislative branch, thus
violating the doctrine of separation of powers. 6 On summary
judgment motions from both sides, the Supreme Court held that
plaintiffs had standing, but "Executive Order No. 20 did not run
afoul of the separation of powers doctrine .... ""
On appeal, the Appellate Division, Third Department, considered
the issue of whether plaintiffs had standing to bring their cause of
action. In a rather short majority opinion, the court began its
discussion of the case by noting that an initial determination as to
standing had to be made because it was the key for plaintiffs to
9 Id. at 278, 711 N.E.2d at 980, 689 N.Y.S.2d at 703.
10 See N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 10, § 405.28(d) (1990).
1 Rudder 1, 246 A.D.2d at 185, 675 N.Y.S.2d at 655.
12 Id at 186,675 N.Y.S.2d at 656.
13 Id. at 188, 675 N.Y.S.2d at 657.
14 Id. at 185, 675 N.Y.S.2d at 655.
15 See N.Y. COMP. CODES RL & REGS. tit. 9, § 5.20 (1998).
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unlock the gateway to judicial review.I" The court understood
current legislation regulating qualified social workers works against
them in that they would have to be replaced by individuals who held
Masters degrees in social work. 9 Nevertheless, the court still found
that the plaintiff organizations lacked specific harm, and held that
they "failed to sustain their burden of establishing standing in this
matter.
2 0
The Court of Appeals considered the issue of whether plaintiffs
had standing to challenge Executive Order No. 20.21 The Court
1s Rudder 1, 246 A.D.2d at 185, 675 N.Y.S.2d at 655 (citing The Soc'y of the
Plastics Indus., Inc. v. County of Suffolk, 77 N.Y.2d 761, 655 N.E.2d 1034, 570
N.Y.S.2d 778 (1991)).
19 Id. at 186, 675 N.Y.S.2d at 656.
o Id. The three page majority opinion focused on whether plaintiffs had
standing to bring the cause of action and, by establishing that no standing could
be conferred, did not reach the issue of whether the GORR is unconstitutional
based on the doctrine of separation of powers. While the Supreme Court found
the GORR unconstitutional, the Appellate Division failed to reach this issue,
dismissing the cause of action on the basis that plaintiffs failed to have standing.
The seven page dissenting opinion, however, found that at least one of the
organizational plaintiffs met the standing requirements as set forth in The Soc 'y
of the Plastics Indus., Inc. and noted the executive order establishing the GORR
violated the doctrine of the separation of powers. Id. at 190, 675 N.Y.S.2d at
658 (Mercure, J., dissenting). Justice Mecure, with whom Justice Spain
concurred, noted the "State Constitution provides for a distribution of powers
among the three branches of government, an arrangement that serves to prevent
an excessive concentration of power in any one branch or in any one person."
Id. "As related to the various entities within the executive branch... the
Governor has the power to oversee but not necessarily to direct." Id. (citing
Rapp, 44 N.Y.2d at 162, 375 N.E.2d at 748, 404 N.Y.S.2d at 567). The dissent
added that in their "view, the executive order's grant of absolute veto power
over proposed rulemaking provides an enforcement mechanism far exceeding
that employed in present or former legislative enactment." Id at 191, 675
N.Y.S.2d at 659 (Mercure, J., dissenting). "Employing 'absolute rules and
proscriptions' instead of guidelines, that aspect of the executive order lacks any
cognizable legal basis." Id. The grant of absolute power the dissent notes is
found within the Director's ability to stop the rulemaking process by denying
proposed rule amendments rather than authorizing publication or requiring
specified changes be made prior to publication. See N.Y. COMP. CODES R. &
PEGS. tit. 9, § 5.20 (1998).
21 Rudder H1, 93 N.Y.2d at 278, 711 N.E.2d at 980, 689 N.Y.S.2d at 703. The
Court of Appeals elaborated on the organizational standing and touched briefly
on both taxpayer and voter standing. Nonetheless, the Court found that the
600 [Vol 16
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chose to analyze the theory of organizational standing to a greater
extent than it did taxpayer or voter standing.? Taxpayer and voter
standing primarily concerned individual plaintiff Cynthia Rudder
while organizational standing affected the various organization,
group and union plaintiffs.
The Court of Appeals began its analysis of organizational standing
with its citation to, and reliance on, The Soc'y of the Plastics Indus.,
Inc., v. County of Suffolk.23 In Society, the Court of Appeals
identified applicable principles of organizational standing are
embodied in the following three requirements: 4
First, if an association or organization is the
petitioner, the determination to be made is whether
one or more of its members would have standing to
sue; standing cannot be achieved merely by
multiplying the persons a group purports to represent
Second, an association must demonstrate that the
interests it asserts are germane to its purposes so as to
satisfy the court that it is an appropriate representative
of those interests. Third, it must be evident that
neither the asserted claim nor the appropriate relief
requires the participation of the individual members
The Court of Appeals in Rudder asserted that the first two prongs of
organizational standing were at issue by noting that plaintiffs claimed
to represent those who had been harmed by the Director's actions,
and that they were due to have specific interests furthered by the
regulations.26
plaintiffs, organizations and individual, lacked standing to challenge Executive
Order No. 20 and failed to reach the issue of whether the order violated the
doctrine of the separation of powers as noted in the Appellate Division's dissent.
22Id.
23 77 N.Y.2d 761,573 N.E.2d 1034, 1041, 570 N.Y.S.2d 778, 786 (1991).
24 Id. at 775, 573 N.E.2d at 1042, 570 N.Y.S.2d at 786.
25Id.
26 Rudder H, 93 N.Y.2d at 278, 711 N.E.2d at 980, 689 N.Y.S.2d at 704. The
Court of Appeals paraphrased the first prong by stating "an organization
plaintiff must demonstrate a harmful effect on at least one of its members." Id.
2000
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Judge Ciparick stated in Rudder that "[t]he two main groups of
organizational plaintiffs here - those that represent social workers
and those that represent patients who receive social work services -
fail to allege any cognizable harm to their members." 7 Cognizable
harm is another way of saying plaintiffs fail to meet the former "legal
interests" test, now known as the "injury in fact" test. Rooted in the
common law, a "court has no inherent power to right a wrong
unless... the civil, property or personal rights of the plaintiff in the
action or the petitioner in the proceeding are effected."'28 The court
quoted Society that the "core requirement that a court can act only
when the rights of the party requesting relief are effected, has been
variously refashioned over the years."'29 "Once a 'legal interests' test
requiring a litigant to allege injury to a legal interest derived from
common or statutory law, 'injury in fact' has become the touchstone
during recent decades."'3 The 'injury in fact' test is a tool for the
court to use in determining whether a plaintiff has "an actual legal
stake in the matter being adjudicated" and a "concrete interest in
prosecuting the action."'3
In Rudder, the organizational plaintiffs alleged that if the GORR
promulgated the proposed rule there would have been an increase in
potential employment for those individuals who held a Master's in
Social Work (MSW) degree from an accredited educational program.
On the contrary, the "de facto veto of the rule (would have) the effect
of depriving them of that pecuniary and professional advantage." 32 In
essence, the Appellate Division, Third Department, determined that
since no one individual member of organizational plaintiffs met the
legal interests test that the group failed as a whole, thus concluding
organizational plaintiffs failed to meet the first prong of their test for
standing. The Court of Appeals acknowledged some members of
organizational plaintiffs with a Master's degree would have the
7 Id.
28 Schieffelin v. Komfort, 212 N.Y. 520, 530, 106 N.E.2d 675, 677 (1914).
29 The Soc'y of the Plastics Indus., Inc., 77 N.Y.2d at 772, 573 N.E.2d at 1040,
570 N.Y.S.2d at 784.
" Id. See, e.g., Association of Data Processing Serv. Orgs. Inc. v. Camp, 397
U.S. 150 (1970); Matter of Dairylea Coop. v. Walkley, 38 N.Y.2d 6, 339 N.E.2d
865, 377 N.Y.S.2d 451 (1975).
31 Id.
32 Rudder 1, 246 A.D.2d at 188, 675 N.Y.S.2d at 657 (Mecure, J. dissenting).
[Vol 16
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advantage of increased employment opportunities, but found that this
"d[id] not mean that any one individual member with an MSW ha[d]
been injured ' "'
Turning to the second prong of organizational standing, the Rudder
court again relied on the Society decision which noted an
"association must demonstrate that the interests it asserts are
germane to its purposes so as to satisfy the court that it is an
appropriate representative of those interests." This prong has
become known as the "zone of interests" test: that is, "a party must
show that the in-fact injury of which it complains ... falls within the
'zone of interests,' or concerns sought to be promoted or protected
by the statutory provision under which the agency has acted."'35 This
means that "a group.. .whose interests are only marginally related
to, or even inconsistent with, the purposes of the statute cannot use
the courts to further their own purposes at the expense of the
statutory purposes. 36
In Rudder, the Court of Appeals determined that the organizational
plaintiffs failed to meet this test because they "failed to identify any
statutory or constitutional provision intended to prevent economic
injury resulting from decreased employment opportunities."37 The
court's reasoning for this was the representation of the organizational
plaintiffs. Identifying the representation of a few organizational
plaintiffs as being diverse, that is, not exclusively representing
individuals who hold an MSW degree, the court stated that since
33 Rudder 1, 93 N.Y.2d at 279, 711 N.E.2d at 981, 689 N.Y.S2d at 704. The
court reasoned that "the organizations' members who hold MSW's are not
prohibited from seeking a certain portion of available jobs, nor deprived of
monies to which they may be statutorily entitled. Rather, they are merely not
given preference over those who do not hold an MSW degree." Id.
' The Soc 'y of the Plastics Indus., Inc., 77 N.Y.2d at 775, 573 N.E.2d at 1042,
570 N.Y.S.2d at 786.
35 Id. at 773, 573 N.E.2d at 1041, 570 N.Y.S.2d at 785. See, eg., Lujan v. Nat'l
Wildlife Fed'n, 497 U.S. 871 (1990); see also Matter of Mobil Oil Corp. v.
Syracuse Indus. Dev. Agency, 76 N.Y.2d 428, 559 N.E.2d 641, 559 N.Y.S.2d
947 (1990).
36 Transactive Corp. v. New York State Dep't of Soc. Servs., 92 N.Y.2d 579,
587, 706 N.E.2d 1180, 1183, 684 N.Y.S.2d 156, 159 (1998) (citing The Soc'y of
the Plastics Indus. Inc., 77 N.Y.2d at 774, 573 N.E.2d at 1041, 570 N.Y.S.2d at
785).
37 Rudder 11, 93 N.Y.2d at 279,711 N.E.2d at 981, 689 N.Y.S.2d at 704.
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representation covers both individuals with MSW degrees and
individuals without "it cannot be said that the interests of the
organizations dovetail with [the] claims they put forth., 38 The court
explicitly shattered the organizational plaintiffs premise, stating that
"[b]y seeking to enhance job opportunities of only some of their
members - those holding MSW's - these groups implicitly seek to
diminish job opportunities for other of their members - those
otherwise qualified social workers who do not hold MSW's."39 The
diverse interests sought by the organizational plaintiffs for
representation is precisely the entity which brought the court to
conclude there was no standing upon which the organizational
plaintiffs could bring this cause of action.'
While there is no provision in the State Constitution concerning
standing, case law and statutes have developed New York's
requirement on standing. 41 Standing finds its roots in the common
law. The common law requirement is for a plaintiff to have "an
actual legal stake in the matter being adjudicated," further
"ensur[ing] that the party seeking review has some concrete interest
in prosecuting the action ... "42 This is also considered the injury-
in-fact test. New York has defined this requirement by saying "[t]he
party seeking relief must demonstrate that it will suffer direct harm
38 Id.
39 Id. (Italics added).
40 Id. at 280, 711 N.E.2d at 981, 689 N.Y.S.2d at 705. The court did not reach
the third prong of organizational standing, rather it ended its analysis of
organizational standing by concluding the organizational plaintiffs failed to meet
the first two prongs set forth in Society. The court dismissed the cause of action
in Rudder for lack of standing. They were cautious to do so, noting in dicta that
it was not "a case where to deny standing to... plaintiffs would insulate (any)
govemment[al] action from judicial scrutiny." Id. The court expanded this
notion saying "this [case] does not mean that a future plaintiff could not allege
requisite injury based on GORR's decision not to pursue the proposed rule." Id.
"We conclude only that no organizational plaintiff has done so here." Id. at 280,
711 N.E.2d at 982, 689 N.Y.S.2d at 705.
4" The Soc'y of the Plastics Indus., Inc. v. County of Suffolk, 77 N.Y.2d at 772,
573 N.E.2d at 1040, 570 N.Y.S.2d at 783. "The standing requirement in Federal
actions has been grounded in the Federal constitutional requirement of a case or
controversy, a requirement that has no analogue in the State Constitution." (citing
U.S. Const. art. III, § 2, cl. 1; see, e.g., Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, reh.
denied, 468 U.S. 1250 (1984)).
42 Id (citing Schlesinger v. Reservists to Stop the War, 418 U.S. 208 (1974)).
[Vol 16604
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or injury that is different in some way from that of the public at
large.
43
The doctrine of standing has been modified over the years in order
to limit its coverage. Such limitations are clearly set forth in the
Supreme Court's decision in Allen v. Wright.4 Allen notes that the
"judicially self-imposed limits on the exercise of federaljurisdiction"
include a general "prohibition on a litigant's raising another person's
legal rights... and the requirement that a plaintiffs complaint fall
within the zone of interests protected by the law invoked." 5 It is the
zone of interests test that has been "adopted at both State and Federal
levels, [and] has evolved into the crucial test for standing in the
administrative context.. .."64 A party's injury-in-fact must fall with
in the zone of interests that is protected by the by the law which they
seek redress.
The requirement that the injury suffered be within the
zone of interests sought to be protected by the statute
serves to filter our cases in which a person's interests
are so marginally related to or inconsistent with the
purposes implicit in the statute that it cannot
reasonably be assumed that [the drafters] intended to
permit the suit.'
In Society, the court notes that the State law requirement on zone
of interests is analogous to the Federal requirement. That is, if the
plaintiff's injury is only marginally related to, or consistent with, the
purposes the statute seeks to advance, the plaintiff "cannot use the
43 Rudder 1, 246 A.D.2d at 185, 675 N.Y.S.2d at 655. See, Matter of Lee v.
New York City Dept. of Hous. Preservation and Dev., 212 A.D.2d 453, 622
N.Y.S.2d 944 (1st Dep't 1995) appeal dismissed in part, Iv. denied in part 85
N.Y.2d 1029, 655 N.E.2d 398, 631 N.Y.S.2d 284 (1995); Matter of Houston v.
New York State Dept. of Health, 203 A.D.2d 826, 611 N.Y.S.2d 61, iv. denied,
84N.Y.2d 803, 641 N.E.2d 158, 617 N.Y.S.2d 137 (1994).
468 U.S. 737 (1984).
45 Idat 751.
' The-Soc y of the Plastics Indus., Inc., 77 N.Y.2d at 773, 573 N.E.2d at 1041,
570 N.Y.S.2d at 785; see, Matter of Dairylea Coop., 38 N.Y.2d 6, 339 N.E2d
865, 377 N.Y.S.2d 45 1; see also, Clarke v. Securities Indus. Assn., 479 U.S. 388
(1987); cf Greer v. Illinois Hous. Dev. Auth., 122 Ill.2d 462, 524 N.E.2d 561,
120 II.Dec. 531 (1988) (Illinois not accepting the zone of interests test).
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courts to further their own purposes at the expense of the statutory
purpose."'4 Therefore, for the zone of interests test to be satisfied by
a plaintiff, organizational or otherwise, the plaintiff must show that
its alleged injury is sufficiently related to the conditions the
Legislature set- forth..that-it -would not be unreasonable for a cause of
action to arise from it.
Rudder has developed what is now a definitive test for the
determination of organizational standing in New York. While there
is no constitutional provision in New York which establishes
standing for organizations, the fundamental requirements developed
from the common law have been incorporated by New York. These
fundamental requirements are also deeply rooted in the Federal
Constitution and have evolved through the years to refine what
plaintiffs must establish in order to satisfy standing. The
development of the injury-in-fact test and zone-of-interests test are
essential to plaintiffs examining whether they have a cause of action.
It is vital that plaintiffs have an actual legal stake in the matter being
adjudicated and that the matter fall within the zone of interests
sought to be protected by the legislation.
Brian Caulfeld
48 Id. at 774, 573 N.E.2d at 1041, 570 N.Y.S.2d at 785. The court notes this in
the context of a group asserting its own purposes. However, the zone of
interests test goes beyond just organizational plaintiff and is a requirement
necessary for plaintiff s standing.
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